What Will Happen if Employers Drop Health Insurance? A Simulation of Employees’ Willingness to Purchase Insurance in the Individual Market

Jean Marie Abraham and Roger Feldman

National Tax Journal, 2010, vol. 63, issue 2, 191-213

Abstract: Although employer-sponsored insurance is the primary source of health insurance for non-elderly individuals, premium growth and federal health insurance reform, including tax credits to purchase individual insurance, might decrease employers’ propensity to offer coverage. Using estimates from a model of employer-sponsored insurance take-up, we simulate the proportion of workers who hold coverage who would be willing to purchase individual coverage if their employers dropped this benefit. Additionally, we consider how take-up rates would increase given the availability of income-based subsidies for workers who lose insurance.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:63:y:2010:i:2:p:191-213

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