Will Health Insurance Mandates Increase Coverage?Synthesizing Perspectives From Health, Tax, Andbehavioral Economics
David Auerbach,
Janet Holtzblatt,
Paul Jacobs,
Alexandra Minicozzi,
Pamela Moomau and
Chapin White
National Tax Journal, 2010, vol. 63, issue 4, 659-79
Abstract:
This paper provides an analytical framework for evaluating the effects of individual health insurance mandates on coverage. That framework draws from three literatures — health economics, tax compliance, and behavioral economics — to identify the factors that affect people’s responses to health insurance mandates. The health economics literature explains how people value health insurance and how changes in its costs affect coverage. The tax compliance literature indicates that the probability of detection and people’s attitudes toward risk affect perceptions of those costs. The salience of the mandate and social norms — factors from the behavioral economics literature — also may affect coverage decisions.
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:63:y:2010:i:4:p:659-79
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