(Mis-)Using the Tax System to Subsidizehealth Spending
National Tax Journal, 2010, vol. 63, issue 4, 681-94
Health reform created the opportunity to redirect tax incentives to promote greater equity, efficiency, and choice in insurance markets. The opportunity, however, has largely been lost. First, tax credits for insurance will be available only through new health insurance exchanges, not to workers with coverage through their employers, which discriminates against one group of low-income people over another based on where they work, not what they can afford. Second, the “Cadillac” tax on highcost insurance is intended to improve incentives for efficiency in the health system, but it is only a half step that also creates new inequities. Third, new taxes imposed on insurers and health suppliers will ultimately be paid by consumers, contrary to some claims. Finally, a new Medicare tax fails to stabilize the program’s financing and could have the perverse effect of delaying adoption of difficult policy actions needed to place Medicare on a sustainable fiscal path.
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access is restricted to subscribers and members of the National Tax Association.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:63:y:2010:i:4:p:681-94
Access Statistics for this article
National Tax Journal is currently edited by Stacy Dickert-Conlin and William M. Gentry
More articles in National Tax Journal from National Tax Association, National Tax Journal Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The University of Chicago Press ().