An Analysis of the Use of Money to Divert the Exercise of Government Power for the Wealthiest

Austin Murphy
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Austin Murphy: Oakland University

Economic Alternatives, 2020, issue 1, 50-78

Abstract: This paper utilizes a simple mathematical model of the relationship between wealth and political power to indicate the extent to which the wealthiest agents can control government leaders through their investments in politicians and parties that enable them to maximize their return on this political capital just as they do with any commercial investments. This power over government policies is shown to sometimes be efficiently facilitated at the lowest cost through focusing voter choices on divisive issues. The control of government by private elites is demonstrated to be largely unhindered by any feasible limitations on political spending.

Keywords: money; Lobbying; government; political capital; elections; Marxism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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