Climate Change and Global Governance

Boyko Valchev
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Boyko Valchev: University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria

Ikonomiceski i Sotsialni Alternativi, 2021, issue 2, 46-59

Abstract: The article takes for granted the conclusions of natural sciences about climate change. It rather examines how politicians react to the challenges of global warming. It assumes that the high cost of fighting climate change creates comparative advantages and real gains for countries that opt to ignore the problem. This creates powerful incentives for politicians to focus on the short-term gains from defecting instead of on the long-term risks. Therefore, countries are confronted with a prisoner’s dilemma about climate change – the cost of cooperation is higher than the cost of defecting. The conclusion is that the structure of the international system – its anarchy – is the main obstacle to finding a lasting solution to climate change. The resulting assumption is that climate change may prove to be the deciding factor for a radical change in the international system and the creation of working mechanisms for global governance.

Keywords: global warming; prisoner’s dilemma; global governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nwe:iisabg:y:2021:i:2:p:46-59

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