Jocul ciclic – Statele Unite ale Americii versus Coreea de Nord din unghiul teoriei mutărilor strategice

Georgescu Alexandru
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Georgescu Alexandru: Cercetător independent

Revista OEconomica, 2011, issue 04

Abstract:

It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as one side (North Korea) overleverages its position, while the other side makes unproductive compromises.

Keywords: United States; North Korea; Kim Jong-il; Theory of Moves; Nash equilibrium; six party talks; cycle of aggression; information and power asymmetry; regressive induction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C78 C79 D72 D74 D81 D82 F51 F52 F54 F55 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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