Managementul omnipotent şi puterea stimulentelor etatiste. Hazard moral în interiorul corporaţiei moderne

Jora Octavian-Dragomir Iacob Mihaela
Additional contact information
Jora Octavian-Dragomir Iacob Mihaela: Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mihaela IACOB and Octavian-Dragomir JORA ()

Revista OEconomica, 2012, issue 01

Abstract:

The logic of agency problems is that “legally” the principals are (institutionally) hampered from configuring or securing the contractual precautions they wish to enforce out of those available in a pure free market. We review topics pointing that omnipotent management phenomenon is not a so-called “asymmetric information” market failure, but a State failure in protecting private property.

Keywords: business corporation; private property; contract; state interventionism; law of unintended consequences; moral hazard; principal-agent problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B53 K20 L20 M20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://oeconomica.org.ro/abstract/320/Managementul ... te-Hazard-moral.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oen:econom:y:2012:i:01:id:320

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revista OEconomica from Romanian Society for Economic Science, Revista OEconomica Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Octavian Jora ().