ON RISKY BEHAVIOR IN BIMATRIX GAMES

Vladimír Gazda (), Barinková Karolína (), Gróf Marek () and Matus Kubak ()

Annals of Faculty of Economics, 2010, vol. 1, issue 1, 165-169

Abstract: The experiment engaging 50 participants was performed to model and identify the determinants of the players’ risky behavior. Here, a questionnaire and a bimatrix game containing the negative/zero payoffs were used to identify the players’ motives to play risky strategies. Besides the concrete form of the payoffs, the individual risk attitudes were also proved to be statistically significant for risky behavior of the players.

Keywords: Bimatrix Game; Experiment; Risk; Dominant Equilibrium; Maximin; Laplace Insufficient Reason Criterion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 C91 C92 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2010:i:1:p:165-169

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