THE BERTRAND MODEL OF THE SINGLE MARKET

Nicoleta Sirghi and Vadasan Ioana

Annals of Faculty of Economics, 2010, vol. 1, issue 2, 324-329

Abstract: Starting with the signification of the rationality hypothesis when the agentâ€(tm)s contentment is directly affected by the other agentsâ€(tm) decisions, the theory of games defines solutions for solving different situations of conflict. The economic actors have different behaviours of the Single Market. Oligopoly strategic behaviours were analysed by the Bertrand model. The two types revealed in the work show that strategic interactions are sensitive to the companiesâ€(tm) features, products and markets. Regarding the situation when we have an oligopoly competition, the companies make interdependent decisions in the environment affected by risk and uncertainty of the Single Market. For this reason it is an opportunity to study the structure of oligopoly type of of the Single Market with the aid of non â€" cooperative games.

Keywords: the Bertrand model; the Single Market; theory of games; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2010:i:2:p:324-329

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