INFORMATION ASYMMETRY THEORY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS

Marcel Bolos (), Ortan Tudor () and Otgon Cristian ()
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Marcel Bolos: Universitatea din Oradea, Stiinte Economice
Ortan Tudor: Universitatea Oradea, Facultatea de Stiinte Economice
Otgon Cristian: Universitatea Oradea, Facultatea de Stiinte Economice

Annals of Faculty of Economics, 2010, vol. 1, issue 2, 516-522

Abstract: The evolution of corporate ownership structure, in particular the resolution of asymmetric information among stockholders, managers and creditors, requires very complex research. This paper aims to investigate how asymmetric information determines stakeholders to behave and how financial decision bears upon the performance of the organization.

Keywords: asymmetric information; financial decision making; corporate performance; leverage; stockholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G1 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2010:i:2:p:516-522

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