THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY IN ASSESSING THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MECHANISM
Dumiter Florin Cornel ()
Additional contact information
Dumiter Florin Cornel: Vasile Goldis Western University of Arad, Economic Sciences
Annals of Faculty of Economics, 2012, vol. 1, issue 2, 557-563
Abstract:
In the past, central banks used to be very reserved regarding their activities, strategies and monetary policy decisions and actions. As central banks become more and more independent, transparency gained importance based upon accountability arguments. An important fact for adopting an increasing central bank transparency lies in its importance of influencing the development of expectations. The concept of central bank transparency has emerged in the economic literature relatively later than some other key concepts. The widespread agreement of an inflation targeting regime and a more transparent central bank is desired by the most central banks around the world in the context of the need of the public disclosure of macroeconomic models, the quarterly time series for indicators like: inflation, output, budgetary deficit, public debt, interest rate, inflation expectations, the public announcement of the monetary policy decisions, objectives and targets, the publication of some key monetary tools like: inflation report, financial stability report, monetary policy committee report, annual report. These are all key issues in the construction of a more transparent and independent central bank in the context of a good global governance. Moreover, for the fruitful success of the central bank, latum sensu, and monetary policy, stricto sensu, it must be encompassed a complex monetary policy committee mechanism. This complex mechanism must by edowed with the collegial approach of the monetary policy committee, structure of the voting mechanism within the committee, the importance of the person which announces the changes within the interest rates and the public disclosure of these information'(tm)s enriched in a communication strategy. This communication strategy is very important for assessing and public understanding of the central bank'(tm)s actions but also for communicating the objectives, targets and forward looking approaches of the monetary policy in the global context of the transmission mechanism.
Keywords: monetary policy strategy; collegial entity; central bank independence; democratic accountability; transmission mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://anale.steconomiceuoradea.ro/volume/2012/n2/084.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2012:i:2:p:557-563
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Annals of Faculty of Economics from University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catalin ZMOLE ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).