The Costs and Benefits of a Separation of Powers--An Incomplete Contracts Approach

Kira Fuchs and Florian Herold

American Law and Economics Review, 2011, vol. 13, issue 1, 131-167

Abstract: The separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers is a key principle in most democratic constitutions. We analyze the costs and benefits of separating legislature and executive in an incomplete contracts model: the executive can decide to implement public projects. Under separation of powers, the legislature sets up a decision-making framework that leaves the executive with the residual decision-making rights. Separation of powers is the more beneficial, the larger the danger of extreme policy preferences of the residual political decision maker. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2011
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