Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does Judicial Selection Matter?

Timothy Besley

American Law and Economics Review, 2013, vol. 15, issue 1, 212-251

Abstract: Legislation to limit workplace discrimination is among the most common reforms in labor market policy of the past 50 years. Its effectiveness depends on enforcement of the legislation by state and federal agencies and, ultimately, the courts. This paper uses information on discrimination charges in the United States between 1973 and 2000 to analyze whether the number of charges filed is correlated with the method by which state judges are selected. We find evidence that states that appoint their judges have significantly fewer anti-discrimination charges being filed. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy:Does Judicial Selection Matter? (2005)
Working Paper: Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does Judicial Selection Matter? (2005)
Working Paper: Implementation of anti-discrimination policy: does judicial selection matter? (2005)
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