Beliefs, Precedent, and the Dynamics of Access to Justice: A Bayesian Microfounded Model

Giorgio Rampa and Margherita Saraceno

American Law and Economics Review, 2016, vol. 18, issue 2, 272-301

Abstract: This study adds to the literature on how both plaintiffs' beliefs and legal precedent affect access to justice. It also studies how actual accesses to the judiciary result, in turn, in the establishment of further precedent that is able to affect the behavior of new prospective plaintiffs. The analysis is based on a micro-founded Bayesian learning model. The dynamic model shows that precedent, indeed, can rectify biased beliefs. However, the rectification power significantly depends upon both the merit of the case and the stickiness of subjective beliefs. The results highlight that although plaintiffs learn from precedent, under some circumstances meritorious causes of action hardly proceed through the court, or can even disappear from the court after an initial positive trend; on the other hand, frivolous claims can continue to flourish.

Keywords: D83; K41; D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahw010 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:18:y:2016:i:2:p:272-301.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

American Law and Economics Review is currently edited by J.J. Prescott and Albert Choi

More articles in American Law and Economics Review from American Law and Economics Association Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().