The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law

Dhammika Dharmapala and Richard H. McAdams

American Law and Economics Review, 2003, vol. 5, issue 1, 1-31

Abstract: We argue that legislation can generate compliance expressively, independently of deterrence. The Condorcet jury theorem implies that, in certain circumstances, the legislative process aggregates the private information of legislators to reach a decision superior to that of any individual legislator. Citizens may update their beliefs about issues the legislation addresses even though individual legislators are no better informed than individual citizens, and change their behavior in the direction of greater compliance. We first use a model with sincere voting and then consider strategic voting, position-taking preferences, lobbying, and legislative institutions. We use a public smoking ban for illustration, and propose an experimental test. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2003
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