Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis

Donald Wittman

American Law and Economics Review, 2003, vol. 5, issue 1, 61-93

Abstract: Do civil juries follow the broad dictates of the law? For example, do those plaintiffs who suffer greater damages receive greater awards? Are juries consistent? Do juries empty deep pockets? In many states automobile accidents are first tried by a professional arbitrator and then by a jury if one of the litigants is dissatisfied with the outcome. How do the decisions made by professional arbitrators compare to the decisions made by juries? This article seeks to answer these questions by first developing a model of arbitrator selection and then undertaking an empirical study of 380 automobile accident cases that went through both an arbitration and a jury trial. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2003
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