On the Feasibility of Risk Based Regulation

Jón Daníelson
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jon Danielsson

CESifo Economic Studies, 2003, vol. 49, issue 2, 157-179

Abstract: Risk based regulation has emerged as the primary ingredient in the Basel-II proposals, where a bank capital is to become a direct function of a bank's riskiness. While the notion that bank capital be risk sensitive is intuitively appealing, the actual implementation, in the form of Basel-II, carries with it a host of potentially perverse side effects. Basel-II may increase financial risk, both for individual institutions and the entire banking system, and hence promote financial instability. This can happen, e.g., due to the endogenous nature of risk (JEL G2)

Date: 2003
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