On the Role of Labour Market Reform for the Enlargement of a Monetary Union

Andrew Hughes Hallett and Svend E. Hougaard Jensen

CESifo Economic Studies, 2003, vol. 49, issue 3, 355-379

Abstract: This paper studies the incentives to join a monetary union, and the incentives to reform within a monetary union and within the candidate countries, respectively. We present some "orders of magnitude" evidence on the size and balance of the incentive effects for joining and being joined, and on the desirability of reform in and out of the existing EMU in Europe. It is found that countries will only want to join a monetary union where there has been sufficient labour market reform, and where labour markets are more flexible than their own. But existing members will want the same properties of their new partners as well. (JEL F02, F15, F33, F 42)

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/49.3.355 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:49:y:2003:i:3:p:355-379.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

CESifo Economic Studies is currently edited by Panu Poutvaara

More articles in CESifo Economic Studies from CESifo Group Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().