Harmonisation of Old-age Security Within the European Union

Silke Uebelmesser

CESifo Economic Studies, 2004, vol. 50, issue 4, 717-743

Abstract: Not sufficiently harmonised national pension systems within the European Union distort the allocation of labour and endanger redistributive activities. This paper identifies the most decentralised level of harmonisation which guarantees efficient allocation and enables redistribution. For this, we build on theoretical results from the literature to evaluate the realised distribution of the legal power between the European Union and the Member States and the resulting level of harmonisation. We find that harmonisation is sub-optimally low. Binding rules guaranteed by the European Union are needed implying that the Member States have to concede more fundamental responsibilities to the European Union. (JEL F22, H55, K33, N34)

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Harmonisation of Old-Age Security Within the European Union (2003)
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