Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction

Shurojit Chatterji and Sayantan Ghosal

CESifo Economic Studies, 2009, vol. 55, issue 2, 286-305

Abstract: In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time. (JEL codes: Q54, F53, Q50) Copyright , Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009
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