 Punishment as Defiance: Deterrence and Perverse Effects in the Case of Expressive CrimeCESifo Economic Studies, 2014, vol. 60, issue 3, 581-598 Abstract: Expressive crime contrasts with instrumental crime in that delinquents do not seek material benefits. Law breakers are motivated by the desire to ‘make a statement’, possibly against majority attitudes in the society. Fighting expressive crime is complicated by this fact in that increasing intervention may have counter effects. In this article, I present a model of expressive crime. Delinquents are motivated to perform the illegal action because it transmits a signal. If the punishment associated with the crime affects the value of this signal positively, an increase in punishment may serve as defiance, and not as deterrence. Accordingly, the number of law violations may increase if those defied outnumber the deterred. Throughout the analysis, I refer to the case of graffiti spraying in Germany. It has been argued that this case offers an example for an increase in law violations after an increase in available punishment. This claim is discussed with reference to available data. Implications for other forms of expressive crime are drawn. (JEL codes: K14, K42, D03) Date: 2014 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:60:y:2014:i:3:p:581-598. Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article CESifo Economic Studies is currently edited by Panu Poutvaara More articles in CESifo Economic Studies from CESifo Group Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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