Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?

Alessandro Cigno

CESifo Economic Studies, 2014, vol. 60, issue 3, 599-612

Abstract: Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect credit market. In the presence of credit rationing, the parties may not reach an agreement. If they do, the agreement will be inefficient and give one party more utility than the other. Efficiency and utility equalization are guaranteed only by a legally enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce, and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but neither of them guarantees utility equalization. (JEL codes: C78, J12, K36)

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Is Marriage as Good as a Contract? (2013)
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