Do Mobile Pensioners Threaten the Deferred Taxation of Savings?
Volker Meier () and
CESifo Economic Studies, 2015, vol. 61, issue 2, 465-483
We investigate optimal taxation of lifetime income with and without an option to emigrate during old age. The government sets the rates of deferred taxation and of taxes on interest income. With immobile agents, the optimal policy consists of full deferral of income taxes on savings and full taxation of interest. Potential mobility of the old calls for lower degrees of deferral and reduced taxation of interest. However, full immediate taxation of savings in combination with full tax exemption on interest income can never be optimal. (JEL codes: H21, H24, H26).
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Do Mobile Pensioners Threaten the Deferred Taxation of Savings? (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:61:y:2015:i:2:p:465-483.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
CESifo Economic Studies is currently edited by Gerhard Illing
More articles in CESifo Economic Studies from CESifo Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press () and Christopher F. Baum ().