Securities fraud

Norvald Instefjord, Patricia Jackson and William Perraudin

Economic Policy, 1998, vol. 13, issue 27, 586-623

Abstract: Summary Securities fraud It is a matter of incentives from bottom to topRecent frauds in investment banks and securities houses have revealed how vulnerable modern financial institutions are to criminal activity by their employees. In this paper, we examine how regulators may limit the incidence of securities fraud by encouraging firms to provide managers and dealers with appropriate incentives and by imposing ex post penalties once a fraud has been discovered— Norvald Instefjord, Patricia Jackson and William Perraudin

Date: 1998
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