Can power-sharing foster peace? Evidence from Northern Ireland

Hannes Mueller and Dominic Rohner

Economic Policy, 2018, vol. 33, issue 95, 447-484

Abstract: In the absence of power-sharing, minority groups in opposition have powerful incentives to substitute the ballot with the bullet. In contrast, when power is shared among all major groups in society, the relative gains of sticking to electoral politics are larger for minority groups. After making the theoretical argument, we provide in the current paper an empirical analysis of the impact of power-sharing at the local level, making use of fine-grained data from Northern Ireland’s 26 local district councils over the 1973–2001 period. We find that power-sharing has a sizable and robust conflict-reducing impact.

Keywords: Conflict; Terrorism; Peace; Power-Sharing; Elections; Northern Ireland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C26 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Can Power-sharing Foster Peace? Evidence From Northern Ireland (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:33:y:2018:i:95:p:447-484.

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