What’s in a name? That which we call capital controls

Atish Ghosh (), Jun I Kim and Mahvash Qureshi

Economic Policy, 2020, vol. 35, issue 101, 147-208

Abstract: SUMMARYThis paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived since the laissez-faire era of the classical gold standard. While advanced economies often employed capital controls to tame inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use – most notably, a ‘guilt by association’ with controls on capital outflows, which have typically been employed by autocratic regimes or those with failed macroeconomic policies. We formalize the idea of a possible guilt by association between inflow controls and outflow controls in a signalling model and provide some empirics consistent with it.

Keywords: F21; F32; F38; N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: What’s In a Name? That Which We Call Capital Controls (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:35:y:2020:i:101:p:147-208.

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