Rents, rules, or revolution: A survey of institutional pathways to peace
Laura Mayoral and
Hannes Mueller
Economic Policy, 2025, vol. 40, issue 123, 721-759
Abstract:
This article reviews the growing literature on the relationship between institutions—political, administrative, and economic—and the emergence and prevention of armed conflict. We synthesize evidence showing how strong, inclusive, and accountable institutions, including democratic governance and robust state capacity, can reduce the risk of conflict through multiple mechanisms such as inclusion, deterrence, credible commitment, and the effective provision of public goods. At the same time, we examine how conflict can erode institutional quality, creating self-reinforcing cycles of fragility and underdevelopment. The review concludes with a set of policy recommendations aimed at breaking these cycles and outlines a forward-looking research agenda to deepen our understanding of how institutional reform can foster peace and resilience in fragile and conflict-prone settings.
Keywords: Armed Conflict; Political Institutions; Democracy; State Capacity; Property Rights; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:40:y:2025:i:123:p:721-759.
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