Research on low-carbon supply chain decision-making under different incentive models

Decision optimization of low-carbon dual-channel supply chain of auto parts based on smart city architecture

XinXin Peng, YuHong Tao, ChunMei Wang and Zhen Zhong

International Journal of Low-Carbon Technologies, 2022, vol. 17, 696-709

Abstract: Considering the low-carbon supply chain led by one manufacturer and followed by one retailer, market demand is influenced by the investment of low-carbon product promotion and the degree of emission reduction. Stackelberg game theory is used to construct the game models with no-incentive model and three incentive models, respectively. The equilibrium solutions of the degree of low-carbon products promotion, the degree of low-carbon products emission reduction, the market demand, the cost-sharing ratio of the manufacturer to the retailer’s low-carbon products promotion, the degree of government’s incentive to the manufacturer’s low-carbon products, as well as the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profit are obtained in the four models. Finally, with the results, we provide some policy suggestions for the management and practice of a low-carbon supply chain.

Keywords: Stackelberg game; emission reduction; low-carbon supply chain; incentive model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ijlctc:v:17:y:2022:i::p:696-709.

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