PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM CHILE

Aldo Gonzalez () and Alejandro Micco ()

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2014, vol. 10, issue 3, 691-709

Abstract: This article measures the impact of Fiscalía Nacional Económica (FNE), the agency responsible for enforcing competition law, on the outcome of antitrust trials in Chile. Using statistics on lawsuits since the inception of the new Competition Tribunal in 2004, we find that involvement of the public agency increases the probability of obtaining a guilty verdict in an antitrust lawsuit by 40 percentage points. Conditional upon a verdict, prosecutor participation raises the likelihood of a conviction by 38 percentage points. The results are robust to possible selection bias by the public agency. The prosecutor is likely to take part in cases involving sensitive markets and in accusations of collusion. The state-related character of the accused entity, in addition to its size, does not affect the probability of agency intervention.

JEL-codes: K21 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:3:p:691-709.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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