TACIT COLLUSION INDICATORS IN MERGER CONTROL UNDER VARIED FOCAL POINTS

Adrian J. Proctor

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2014, vol. 10, issue 4, 959-987

Abstract: This article discusses how different focal points in a market can lead to different collusive agreements and how merger analysis can identify markets that may be vulnerable to these potential agreements. Focal points based on customer allocation and geographic markets are considered with recent U.K. examples of this type of analysis. The focal point that firms are using for coordination can affect both the transparency required to maintain coordination and how targeted or effective any punishment for deviation can be.

JEL-codes: L L4 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:4:p:959-987.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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