Social Media and Deceptive Patterns: A Way Forward for Antitrust Enforcement

Marcela Mattiuzzo and João Carlos Nicolini de Morais

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 20, issue 4, 343-383

Abstract: The digital public sphere's significance, amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighted concerns on how the concentration of market power can shape social interactions. Antitrust, in particular, has faced calls for reform to better serve democratic goals in this context. However, experts disagree on whether antitrust should be geared towards achieving these objectives. This paper discusses antitrust’s potential in fostering a healthier digital public sphere, particularly through the analysis of deceptive patterns deployed by social media platforms and their competition impact. It first discusses how the concept of deceptive patterns should be conceived—as there is no clear definition universally adopted in either academia or enforcement circles. It then moves on to explore ways to align traditional consumer-welfare antitrust analysis with this topic, by reviewing existing deceptive patterns’ literature, looking at existing taxonomies and how they can help clarify effects on consumers, markets, and society, with a narrowed focus on social media. Lastly, it attempts to offer a framework for the assessment of deceptive patterns in social media by antitrust authorities.

Date: 2024
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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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