REMEDIES IN EU ANTITRUST LAW

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2025, vol. 21, issue 2, 137-162

Abstract: Remedies are central in contemporary EU antitrust enforcement. However, they remain relatively misunderstood. Against this background, this article has three main objectives. It seeks, first, to shed light on the nature and purpose of remedial action under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, with a focus on the European Commission’s activity. The point of intervention, the case law shows, is to bring an infringement effectively to an end. As a matter of positive law, it is unclear that there is room for restorative remedies (that is, remedies that seek to recreate the conditions of competition as they would have existed in the absence of the practice). Second, the article takes a critical perspective on the practice of the past decade. It appears, in particular, that a ‘principles-based approach’ to the administration of remedies is likely to lead to suboptimal outcomes. Finally, some recommendations are outlined so that the letter of the law matches the demands and ambitions of the sort of regulatory-like intervention that is necessary in digital markets and other industries presenting similar features.

JEL-codes: K21 K23 L40 L41 L43 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:21:y:2025:i:2:p:137-162.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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