THE PRICE EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS

Matthew Weinberg

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2008, vol. 4, issue 2, 433-447

Abstract: This paper surveys the literature on the price effects of horizontal mergers. Most mergers examined in the nine studies conducted over the past 22 years resulted in increased prices for both the merging parties and rival firms, at least in the short run. There is some evidence that product prices increase after mergers are announced, but before they are consummated. Recent evidence from consumer product markets suggests that a stricter merger policy is needed to protect consumer welfare.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:4:y:2008:i:2:p:433-447.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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