DETECTION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE HORIZONTAL MERGERS

Kai Hüschelrath
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2009, vol. 5, issue 4, 683-721

Abstract: This paper discusses possibilities to detect anticompetitive horizontal mergers. In particular, it develops a detection framework for antitrust authorities. The framework considers the potential welfare effects of mergers through changes in product prices and efficiencies, as well as product variety, marketing, and innovation incentives. The implementation of the framework is addressed through the derivation of back-of-the-envelope formulas.

JEL-codes: K21 L40 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhp008 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Detection of Anticompetitive Horizontal Mergers (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:5:y:2009:i:4:p:683-721.

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

More articles in Journal of Competition Law and Economics from Oxford University Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().