ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF A ROAD-SURFACING CARTEL IN SWITZERLAND

Kai Hüschelrath, Nina Leheyda and Patrick Beschorner
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2010, vol. 6, issue 2, 335-374

Abstract: The paper assesses the impact of the detection of a hard-core cartel in the Swiss market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addition to an investigation of supply-side factors, demand-side factors, and market prices, the paper also derives estimates of the economic effects of the Swiss Competition Commission's decision in the road-surfacing cartel case. The results indicate that the detection of the cartel may have led to short-term price reductions; however, the persistent collusion-friendly industry structure forecloses larger and durable gains for the customers.

JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Assessing the effects of a road surfacing cartel in Switzerland (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:6:y:2010:i:2:p:335-374.

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