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QUANTIFICATION OF HARM IN DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR ANTITRUST INFRINGEMENTS: INSIGHTS FROM GERMAN CARTEL CASES

Hans Friederiszick and Lars-Hendrik Röller

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2010, vol. 6, issue 3, 595-618

Abstract: This paper argues that empirical economic analysis in court proceedings is subject to important economic and legal restrictions, cumulating in a fundamental trade-off between accuracy and practicality. We draw lessons from two influential German court cases—the paper wholesaler cartel decision of 2007 and the cement cartel decision of 2009. We characterize the trade-offs arguing that they need to be well understood and made transparent, and that decisions on how to proceed in light of these trade-offs need to be taken upfront by the court. In this respect, we believe that the three-step procedure (design, application, and robustness checks) followed by the German court in the cement case is well suited to meet the appropriate legal standard and requirements, both with respect to accuracy and practicality.

JEL-codes: C10 K21 K41 L12 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Quantification of harm in damages actions for antitrust infringements: Insights from German cartel cases (2010) Downloads
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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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