TRANSPARENCY AND COORDINATED EFFECTS IN EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL

Svend Albæk, Peter Møllgaard and Per Baltzer Overgaard

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2010, vol. 6, issue 4, 839-851

Abstract: In this paper, we first outline the foundations in economic theory of so-called coordinated effects with a particular view to mergers and with a special focus on transparency. Then, we review a number of seminal merger cases in EU competition policy (Airtours, Sony/BMG, ABF/GBI Business) in light of that theory. Next, we discuss in more detail a recent Danish merger prohibition that was based on the presence of coordinated effects. This case poses special challenges to the theory of coordinated effects, because a very large number of products were involved, and significant, individualized discounts were widespread in the market in question. Finally, we briefly present a few other cases in which transparency has been an issue.

JEL-codes: D83 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:6:y:2010:i:4:p:839-851.

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