A “PRINCIPLED” APPROACH TO THE DESIGN OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

Dennis L. Weisman

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2010, vol. 6, issue 4, 927-956

Abstract: The Obama administration came into power championing a philosophical shift in regulatory and antitrust policy. The telecommunications industry was singled out by the administration as a case where past regulatory or antitrust policies may have been too permissive. Prominent policy issues slated for (re)examination include forbearance from network unbundling obligations, net neutrality regulation, and prospective market failures in the provision of broadband. The principal objective of this article is to develop a set of competition and regulatory principles, firmly grounded in the law and economics literature, that can serve to inform the design of the optimal public policy for the telecommunications sector.

JEL-codes: K21 L43 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:6:y:2010:i:4:p:927-956.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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