 TOO MANY UNNECESSARY MERGER NOTIFICATIONS IN IRELAND?Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2011, vol. 7, issue 3, 651-670 Abstract: The market for corporate control plays an important role in ensuring that assets are deployed in an efficient and effective manner. However, on occasion, mergers might lead to a reduction in competition and a consequent rise in prices and/or other anticompetitive effects. Ireland's Competition Act 2002 provides that all mergers that meet certain financial thresholds must be notified to Ireland's Competition Authority so that they are subject to a competitive effects assessment. However, there are concerns that the notification thresholds result in many mergers with little or no nexus to Ireland being notified. While it is the case that the vast majority of merger notifications do not raise competition concerns, Ireland is not out of line with other jurisdictions that have mandatory notification thresholds such as the European Union and the United States. Nevertheless, that should not lead to complacency. This article quantifies the impact of reforms made in 2006 and 2007 by the Competition Authority and the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Employment to Ireland's merger notification thresholds. The evidence suggests that these tighter, better specified thresholds led to a reduction of at least 40 to 50 percent in the number of merger notifications. However, more could be done, albeit probably to a lesser extent than the earlier reforms. Applying the International Competition Network's Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures, a series of proposals are made in this article for revising the merger notification thresholds to better select mergers with a nexus to Ireland. Such moves should facilitate a more effective and efficient market for merger control by reducing transaction costs involved in the merger process as well as allowing Competition Authority resources to be deployed elsewhere, a not inconsiderable advantage in a period of austerity. JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:7:y:2011:i:3:p:651-670. Access Statistics for this article Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti More articles in Journal of Competition Law and Economics from Oxford University Press |
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