 CAREER DEVELOPMENT AFTER CARTEL PROSECUTION: CARTEL VERSUS NON-CARTEL MANAGERSN.S.R. Rosenboom Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2012, vol. 8, issue 1, 145-165 Abstract: I examine the career development of managers after they have been subjected to cartel prosecution by the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa). A representative function is used as an indicator for a career outcome after prosecution. I compare the career development of Dutch managers involved in a cartel with that of a control group of Dutch managers of non-cartel companies. I analyze the different factors that may influence the career development of cartel-involved managers. This article concludes that cartel-involved managers face negative career effects after the prosecution of the cartel. A cartel-involved manager has a lower probability of a representative function than another manager. This negative career effect is smaller if the cartel was active in the construction sector. This outcome might point at a different culture towards cartels in the construction sector in the Netherlands, which seems plausible considering the wide-ranging cartel that existed in this sector between 1998 and 2001. JEL-codes: K21 L40 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:145-165. Access Statistics for this article Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti More articles in Journal of Competition Law and Economics from Oxford University Press |
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