BUYING ALLIANCES AND INPUT PRICE FIXING: IN SEARCH OF A EUROPEAN ENFORCEMENT STANDARD

Ariel Ezrachi

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2012, vol. 8, issue 1, 47-71

Abstract: This article considers the welfare implications of input price fixing and the enforcement standard to be applied to these arrangements. It explores the way in which European competition law approaches input price fixing, the scope of the object-based approach and the instances in which effects-based analysis may be used in the appraisal. In doing so, the article sets to clarify the legal approach to price fixing of a procured input. It outlines a possible benchmark for the assessment of input price fixing, with the aim of sharpening the dividing line between instances that restrict competition by object, and those that necessitate consideration of effects.

JEL-codes: K21 L12 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:47-71.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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