BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLIZATION

Maurice E. Stucke

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2012, vol. 8, issue 3, 545-574

Abstract: One hot topic is whether Google has violated the antitrust laws. Another important topic is how behavioral economics can enrich antitrust policy. This article examines two implications of behavioral economics on antitrust monopolization law. The article first discusses trial-and-error learning as an entry barrier. This is timely given the current debate over the entry barriers of the search engine market. The article next discusses behavioral exploitation to maintain a monopoly. The behavioral economics literature can help explain the European Commission's tying claims against Microsoft, why the Commission's original remedy failed, and the benefits and risks of the Commission's remedy involving its subsequent prosecution of Microsoft over Internet browsers.

JEL-codes: D42 L11 L12 L40 L41 L63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:8:y:2012:i:3:p:545-574.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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