LEGAL TRANSPLANT, LEGAL ORIGIN, AND ANTITRUST EFFECTIVENESS

Tay-Cheng Ma

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 9, issue 1, 65-88

Abstract: This article shows that, in the process of antitrust transplant, the impact of legal tradition on antitrust effectiveness depends on whether or not the country is receptive to the transplanted antitrust regime. A successful antitrust transplant requires institutional structures in host countries that are able to support and maintain transplanted laws. If the transplant country fails to meet this institutional requirement, then the enforcement of competition law will have a very limited effect in regard to improving market competition, and its transplantation will be neither harmful nor helpful in terms of law enforcement. At this point, regardless of the legal tradition in which the antitrust judiciary appears, there is little correlation between legal origin and antitrust effectiveness.

JEL-codes: L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:1:p:65-88.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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