Are Retaliatory Trade Measures Justified under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards?

Yong-Shik Lee

Journal of International Economic Law, 2019, vol. 22, issue 3, 439-458

Abstract: In March 2018, the USA adopted measures to increase tariffs on a range of imported steel and aluminum products, claiming that the measures are justified for its national security concerns. Several World Trade Organization Members, including the European Union, India, Russia, Turkey, and China, have argued that the US measures are in violation of WTO rules on safeguard measures and adopted retaliatory measures invoking Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The USA argues that its measures do not constitute safeguard measures under WTO rules, and, therefore, the retaliatory measures are not justified under the SA. This article reviews relevant cases and examines whether the US measures are safeguard measures under the SA and whether the retaliatory measures are also justified under the SA. The article also discusses the need for regulatory reform to address the issues with unilateral trade measures and retaliation.

Date: 2019
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