Energy Pricing Policies and the International Trade Regime

Tom S H Moerenhout

Journal of International Economic Law, 2020, vol. 23, issue 1, 119-141

Abstract: Energy subsidy and pricing reform is widely heralded as a necessity to transition to sustainable development and keep global warming below 2°C. Energy pricing policies and subsidies are also at the heart of the energy–trade–climate nexus, but progress has been slow within the international trade regime. This is unlike other international organizations or networks, where progress has been more substantial. This article investigates the lack of legitimacy to regulate or coordinate pricing reform and links it to fundamentally divergent interests between fuel producers and importers. The article discusses the regulatory and coordinative potential of the World Trade Organization and preferential trade agreements. It finds that at the World Trade Organization, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, case law, Ricardian theory, and negotiation history all preempt the consideration of most pricing policies as subsidies. As a result, subsidy notification within the World Trade Organization is low and while other options for improving transparency via the Committee on Trade and Environment and Trade Policy Review Mechanism have been suggested, not much has actually happened because producers protect their comparative advantage. Therefore, support for fuel pricing reform remains on a general level via Ministerial Statements or through general provisions in preferential trade agreements that reconfirm the G-20 and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation commitments to fuel subsidy reform. The only real advancement has been made within bilateral trade negotiations where heavyweights such as the European Union can push trading partners to abandon dual pricing policies.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jiel/jgz026 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:23:y:2020:i:1:p:119-141.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Economic Law is currently edited by Kathleen Claussen, Sergio Puig and Michael Waibel

More articles in Journal of International Economic Law from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().