Constructing a global panopticon: towards a jurisprudence of weaponized interdependence

J Benton Heath

Journal of International Economic Law, 2025, vol. 28, issue 3, 505-522

Abstract: The phenomenon of weaponized interdependence, as defined by political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, is a powerful tool for understanding today's global economic conflicts. But to date its uptake in the legal literature has been largely superficial, limited to the observation that economic interdependence coming under increased strain from the growing use of sanctions, export controls, investment screening, and similar measures. The real epistemic power of weaponized interdependence is to make political science nimble—able to identify and analyze similar dynamics across seemingly unconnected issue areas—remains largely untapped.This essay sketches an approach for developing a jurisprudence of weaponized interdependence, focusing on what Farrell and Newman term the "panopticon effect." It identifies four legal processes—herding, enclosure, legibility, and jurisdictional politics—which create the conditions for weaponizing a network. The essay develops an account of these four processes by reopening the case study of the SWIFT financial messaging system, which also figures prominently in Farrell and Newman's own work. The history of the SWIFT network, this essay argues, shows how law—defined broadly and understood across many sites of lawmaking—intervenes at critical points to create the conditions for weaponization.In developing this account, this essay also serves as a proof of concept for a broader jurisprudence of weaponized interdependence, which could make lawyers similarly nimble in confronting the manifold challenges of a politicized global economy in times of rapid technological change and rising authoritarianism.

Date: 2025
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