Optimal Level of Financial Regulation under the GATS: A Regulatory Competition and Cooperation Framework for Capital Adequacy and Disclosure of Information
Mahmood Bagheri and
Chizu Nakajima
Journal of International Economic Law, 2002, vol. 5, issue 2, 507-530
Abstract:
Optimal level of regulation and regulatory reform seem to be an undisputed objective. However, in the context of financial regulation there are differences and disagreements over the optimal level of disclosure of information and capital adequacy standards. In this paper, instead of offering a substantive solution, we argue for a competitive process through which the optimal level of disclosure of information and capital adequacy standards are likely to emerge. The solution, which we suggest, consists of an international framework combining competition and cooperation among national regulatory regimes. We identify WTO-GATS as such a framework, which facilitates both regulatory competition and regulatory cooperation. The ultimate outcome of this integrated process, which simultaneously emphasizes liberalization and regulation of financial markets is the emergence of an optimal level of regulation related to mandatory disclosure of information and capital adequacy standards. Copyright Oxford University Press 2002, Oxford University Press.
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:5:y:2002:i:2:p:507-530
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Journal of International Economic Law is currently edited by Kathleen Claussen, Sergio Puig and Michael Waibel
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