 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATIONJournal of International Economic Law, 2004, vol. 7, issue 2, 449-457 Abstract: With the advent of the TRIPS Agreement, international disputes about governmental regulation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) are now subject to adjudication within the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. The standard model used by economists to explain dispute settlement procedures is misleading, for the process is not about preventing countries from exercising market power. Rather, the system is designed to resolve political market failures arising within countries that would be harmful to market access for foreign firms. These issues arise particularly in the context of IPRs, which may be used as cross-market bargaining chips. This possibility is illustrated by the petition of Ecuador to suspend concessions in this area for European firms in the context of the EU -- Banana case. The scope of such an approach remains unclear and there are many fundamental questions deserving close analysis. In this paper I make several basic points relating to the economics of IPRs and the World Trade Organization' Date: 2004 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:449-457 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of International Economic Law is currently edited by Kathleen Claussen, Sergio Puig and Michael Waibel More articles in Journal of International Economic Law from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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