The morphing of dictators: why dictators get worse over time

Kaushik Basu

Oxford Open Economics, 2023, vol. 2, 1-19

Abstract: Dictators, even those who seize power with the intention of helping the nation, frequently morph over time into tyrants. There may be many reasons for this. This paper focuses on one interesting and arguably pervasive driver behind this process. A model is developed which shows that the series of decisions taken over time by an authoritarian leader concerning how much political intrigue and evil to indulge in in order to stay in power leads to a dynamic inconsistency converting the leader into a tyrant. It is possible that the dictator will, eventually, come to regret this, but by then they have no exit options. The analysis prompts us to think about ex ante rules and term-limit provisions to prevent this from happening.

Keywords: dynamic inconsistency; procrastination; term limit; tyrant; dictator (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ooecxx:v:2:y:2023:i::p:1-19.

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