Optimal large population Tullock contests

Ratul Lahkar and Saptarshi Mukherjee

Oxford Open Economics, 2023, vol. 2, 289-294

Abstract: We consider Tullock contests where contestants can be divided into a finite set of types according to their strategy cost function. Solving such contests is intractable if the number of players is finite but large and there are nonlinearities and asymmetries present. But by approximating the finite player contest with a large population model that can be solved in closed form, we can approximate equilibrium behavior in the finite player model. We then characterize the optimal bias parameters of the large population contest and interpret them as approximations of optimal bias parameters in finite player contests. We also identify conditions under which those parameters are increasing or decreasing according to the cost parameters. The parameters are biased in favor of high-cost agents if the cost functions are strictly convex and the likelihood of success is sufficiently responsive to strategy.

Keywords: Contest Design; Tullock Contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ooec/odad003 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ooecxx:v:2:y:2023:i::p:289-94.

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Open Economics is currently edited by Professor Ugo Panizza

More articles in Oxford Open Economics from Oxford University Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().